The Church also attempted to defend its position and influence by increasing its visibility. Thus, pilgrimages to Rome and new pilgrimage sites such as Lourdes were strongly encouraged by the Church. Moreover, new, conspicuous churches were built, such as the Sacré-Coeur in Paris, which was meant as atonement for the sins committed during the Commune of 1871. The Jesuits, in particular, promoted the veneration of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, which symbolized God's love for mankind, and Catholics were encouraged to hang a small medallion of the Sacred Heart at the entrance of their house.
This new sacralization or Catholization of the public sphere and the simultaneous advance of Catholic organizations, trade unions and political parties caused discontent in the progressive, anticlerical camp. In France matters came to a hard confrontation when in 1901 a left-wing government determined that all monastic orders should receive official recognition. The subsequent government refused this recognition based on the argument that the orders were subordinate to a foreign power: the Vatican. It therefore closed down 12,000 Catholic private schools, and 50,000 monks and nuns left the country.
In 1905 a law that radically separated Church and state was introduced, and as a result the government stopped paying the salaries of the secular clergy.
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Since in Italy, Germany and France the state thus succeeded in diminishing the public role and influence of the Church as an institution, the urgency to combat clericalism in all its aspects slowly diminished. However, this was not the case in Spain.
Here, the state failed to diminish the public role of the Church, and as a consequence anticlericals stepped up their efforts.
Anticlericalism in Spain, 1833-1931
In Spain relations between the state and the Church were not free from frictions during most of the 19 th century. Because the Napoleonic occupation of Spain -which began in 1808 -never succeeded in pacifying the entire country, the first major wave of secularization of church properties would begin only in the 1830s. Later in the century, especially in politically unstable times, anticlerical outbursts continued to occur, but most were minor incidents without fatalities. At the same time, a more intellectual, upper-and middle-class anticlericalism developed, which found expression in plays, novels, newspaper articles and caricatures. Anticlericalism, moreover, became the common denominator of the moderate and radical left, and anticlerical remarks could be found in most progressive periodicals. There were even a few specialized journals, whose pages were filled with stories about lascivious priests, greedy monks, lazy nuns and hypocritical Catholics. There were also a few attempts to found private secular schools, while in freethinking societies, republican clubs and freemason lodges inflammatory speeches were given, and, in imitation of Sainte-Beuve, festive banquets were organized on Good Friday.
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Nevertheless, the rival positions only radicalized around 1900. This was primarily caused by the fact that both Catholics and progressive groups were increasingly trying to mobilize a mass audience while sacralizing their cause. Politics was no longer a matter of closed meetings and preaching to the converted but moved to the streets. Mass manifestations were partly a response to large-scale and well-organized processions and pilgrimages. 19 Two specific developments caused further growth in anticlericalism. In 1898 Spain lost its last major colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines after a short but disastrous war against the United States. This outcome was at least partly the result of the discontent of the population of these colonies, and as the Church had played a major role in converting, educating and controlling the population, especially in the Philippines, it was seen as one of the culprits for the military defeat. Moreover, progressive Spaniards argued that a drastic modernization of the country was needed in order to escape being overrun and maybe even occupied by one of the Great Powers, and Another favoured issue was the unnatural attitude of the clergy towards sexuality.
The male clerics who dressed as women were expected to abstain from any sexual activity. Opponents argued that this abstention was a denial of human nature and could A major point of criticism -which was also used against other typical scapegoats such as Jews, ethnic minorities and freemasons -was the mysterious character of the clergy. Everything was done in secret, in the confessional or behind the walls of an enclosed monastery. The Jesuits, in particular, were accused of operating clandestinely.
They formed an uncontrolled but extremely powerful and wealthy sect that exerted an enormous influence behind the scenes, especially in the highest circles of society. The
Church was thus like a spider or an octopus that stretched its tentacles everywhere.
Lerroux also metaphorically compared the Church to an infectious disease that had fatally weakened the people and had to be eradicated.
In this diatribe against the clergy and religion Lerroux often resorted to religious imagery. Science was a magic potion that the people needed to defeat the dragon (Church) that lived in the cave of darkness or to exorcise the devil. The nation was compared to Christ; she was an innocent lamb sacrificed to save mankind. But one day the people would be resurrected and win the final battle against evil. The people were like Moses, who guided the nation through the Red Sea and the desert and led her to the Promised Land. In the form that Lerroux gave to his political activities religious elements can also be identified, which it can be argued conferred upon his ideology many of the characteristics of a political religion (including using violence against political opponents). It is obvious that this was largely done to attract a poorly educated and often even illiterate audience. Therefore, the sacralization of politics seems to be inextricably linked with the emergence of mass politics around 1900. The destruction of Catholic buildings and symbols was often the most obvious sign that a new era had begun. The only buildings that in many regions were destroyed or set on fire were churches and monasteries. Sometimes the population limited itself to removing the statues of saints and other religious paraphernalia and giving the church buildings a new function as garage, storage room, hospital, dance hall, barracks or party headquarters. More often, however, it was believed that a real purification could take place only through fire. Desecrating liturgical objects also belonged to the often spontaneously invented rituals. Members of militias trampled on hosts and put on chasubles and other religious garments to celebrate mock masses or processions. The Spanish historian Julio de la Cueva seems to agree with Brenan and Hobsbawm when he refers to the almost millenarian aspects of the anticlerical violence. He concludes that the aggressive behaviour towards sacred images and devotional objects seemed to 'reveal a basic, almost magical belief in their might and the necessity to escape from their influence at any cost'. In the Andalusian village of Lepe, for instance, the inhabitants attacked the formerly adored patroness saint of the village with an unprecedented ferocity, pulling out her eyes, stripping her from clothes and jewels, shooting her, chopping her to pieces and throwing the remains into the river. 38 The prominent American historian of religion Bruce Lincoln proposes a slightly different and more utilitarian interpretation of these anticlerical atrocities. According to him, they should be seen as acts of iconoclasm, as 'the deliberate and public shattering of sacred symbols with the implicit intent of dissolving all loyalty to the institution which employs those symbols, and, further, of dissipating all respect for the ideology which that institution propagates'. In this he seems to emphasize the atheistic convictions of those who perpetrated these acts, but even for the most radical anticlericals these actions probably also contained an element of breaking the spell that the Catholic religion had cast over the population at large and maybe even over themselves. Lincoln actually gives various examples in which the long-buried corpses of priests, monks and nuns were exhumed and publicly displayed, sometimes for several days. As these bodies were decomposed, it became manifest that even the members of the clergy were subject to death and decay. Many people who went to see the 'spectacle' laughed and jeered at them, as if they experienced 'joy or liberation at the degradation of the mighty'. In this way the anticlericals tried to demonstrate 'the powerlessness of the icon'. which the country had suffered for so long, and for this task some bullets and explosives could certainly be expended.
De la Cueva describes other symbolic acts perpetrated in the first months of the Civil War. Thus, crucifixes and statues of saints along public roads were destroyed. In a graveyard in Aragon a man even tried to remove all religious references from the tombs with a chisel. The common adiós as a farewell salute was abolished. Cursing came into fashion and became a way to make clear that one was on the correct side. In some companies blaspheming contests were held. The author also makes clear that this purification was not limited to the public sphere but invaded the private sphere as well. In many villages a large-scale collection of private religious objects was held, including images of saints, devotional pictures, dolls of the child Jesus and medallions of the Sacred Heart. These were lumped together and set on fire.
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These events might provide a better understanding of the anticlerical fury of this period.
One could argue that the clergy and the Church made easy targets. Rich landowners, right-wing politicians and large employers knew that they could become a victim of the workers' militia and immediately took measures to escape or to defend themselves, but this was much less the case with the Church and its servants. But by attacking clergymen left-wing militants did not so much target the Church's political but its moral and symbolic power. And this 'soft power' was more pervasive and therefore more dangerous than the hard power of the military insurgents, right-wing politicians and their supporters.
The latter could conquer only the public space, whereas the Church entered the homes and private lives of the great majority of the population. The totalitarian ambitions of the anticlerical firebrands also aimed to reach into the private sphere and therefore primarily targeted the clergy. They probably did not so much fear the influence of the Church on themselves, but they wanted to protect their children and wives from it. The anticlerical fury thus had a clear gendered aspect as well. Those opponents who could most easily penetrate the female sphere -the priests and confessors -should thus be physically eliminated, while the religious objects should be radically purged from each home. This in a way is confirmed by an old lady from Barcelona who did not want her image of the 41 De la Cueva, 'Religious persecution', 362-3.
Virgin Mary to be removed and hoped to protect it (and herself) by attaching an ensign of the Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI) to it, exclaiming 'this is the virgin of the FAI! This is one of ours!' 42 Although the lady vainly hoped that a compromise was still possible, she clearly understood that the main issue was the spiritual domination of her own living space and in the end her mind and her heart. In this sense the almost totalitarian anticlericalism that expressed itself in the Republican zone seems to be a political religion that was imposed from below.
However, there are a few aspects that call into question this conclusion. It has also been shown that the Spanish Civil War should not be seen -not even partially -as an archaic religious war. While in other major Catholic countries in Europe the state had succeeded in restricting the influence of the Church in the public sphere during the second half of the 19 th century this had not been the case in Spain. As a result, the increasing political polarization between left and right -which happened almost everywhere in Europe during the interwar years -became enmeshed with a maybe even more intense struggle between clericals and anticlericals. What was at stake was not merely the power over the state and the public space but the almost totalitarian dominance over the private sphere and over the hearts and minds of the population.
Although it is clear that the fierce anticlerical preaching of politicians and intellectuals such as Lerroux had prepared the ground for the anticlerical violence of 1936, anticlerical rhetoric had proven to be a successful strategy to mobilize the masses and unite all revolutionary forces. However, the outburst of anticlerical violence in 1936
was not coordinated from above but was a spontaneous response by the public to this rhetoric. Apparently, there was a large demand from below for ideologies that gave an all-encompassing and absolute solution to all human problems and sufferings, and this certainly proved to be the case in Spain. As a result the rise and 'success' of political religions cannot be attributed only to irrational but charismatic politicians, such as Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin.
There are, nevertheless, some limits to the applicability of a political-religion approach to Spanish anticlericalism. In the first place it was a quite ephemeral phenomenon and did not become an integrated and institutionalized part of a totalitarian regime. When in the spring of 1937 the government regained control over the republican territories public order was more or less restored. As a consequence anticlerical violence However, by interpreting anticlericalism as a form of sacralization of politics it has also become clear that Spanish developments were not very exceptional. The anticlerical violence should not be seen as an atavistic outburst of millenarian beliefs or archaic forms of protests nor as a more rational reaction to centuries of political oppression and economic exploitation but as a phenomenon that was quite typical of the difficult transition to the age of mass politics that took place all over Europe during the first half of the 20 th century.
